More poorly redacted SSI documents surface.

UPDATE: The document was finally removed from the Government server a full 48 hours after I alerted Blogger Bob to the breech in SSI policy.

Another poorly redacted SSI document has been found on a Government server.

Original document original-ssi.pdf, document with redactions removed tsa-ssi-02.pdf

This latest breech of TSA policy was reported by Cryptome.

Once again the information hidden under the black boxes is not sensitive.

Some of the supposed Sensitive Security Information included in this document is this gem. (REDACTED information in red)

The appellant has been employed as a Transportation Security Specialist with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) since September 2003. Hearing Transcript (HT) at 10-13. As such, he is tasked with covert testing of baggage and passenger security systems at U.S. airports and with overseeing a team of three to five people in conducting tests involving bags and passenger checkpoints.

What in the world can be so sensitive about the number of people this guy oversees?

Next gem.

He asserted that the agency?s actions were in retaliation for protected disclosures, i.e., his criticism of proposed changes in standard operating procedures (SOPs) for checked baggage screening.

Really? That is SSI?

The TSA hides behind the SSI designations where they are not needed and it weakens the justification for areas where SSI might be needed.

Like

The appellant believed that the existing SOP required resolution of the EDS alarm by EDT testing of the outside and a search of the contents of the bag to determine the source of the alarm, whereas the revised version would require EDT testing of the outside and then a physical search only if that test was positive.

or

He also asserted that, in covert testing, the ETD machine often failed to detect a residue level that was ?20 million times more explosive? than the machine?s manufacturer stated it would detect. Id.3

3 This figure was based on the appellant?s assertion that the manufacturer claimed machines could detect 1 part per billion of explosive residue in a sample but that in covert testing a 2 percent (or two parts per hundred) residue was often not detected. AF, Tab 1, Exh. 1 (September 28, 2007 letters to various officials).

How can we expect the TSA to protect us when they are unable to protect their own documents? How can we trust them to be truthful about the need for MMW (Nude-O-Scopes) if they continue to lie by claiming information is SSI when it does not need to be?

The TSA has proven itself to be an agency that thinks it is above the law as evidenced by the improper use of the SSI designation, the heavy handed attacks on bloggers, refusal of a Congressional request for the latest SOP and repeated rights violations.

Time to dismantle the TSA and start fresh, maybe this time we can get real security for the Billions spent.